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Among the most formidable defenses of the medieval world was the triple 
collar of walls, studded with closely spaced towers, surrounding Constantinople, 
the successor city to the glory of Rome. The triple walls are attributed to 
Emperor Theodosius, the last emperor to rule over the combined eastern and 
western portions of the Roman Empire. The triple walls were intended to protect 
the capital of the ancient empire of Byzantium, a city renowned for its culture, 
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art, and extravagance. For more than one thousand years the city’s walls had 
never been breached, “they had held firm, so that when the army of Sultan 
Mehmet finally reined up outside the city on April 6, 1453, the defenders had 
reasonable hopes of survival.”1 However, technological advances developed by 
a Hungarian cannon founder named Orban, and enthusiastically embraced by 
the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet, resulted in the creation of an epic cannon never 
seen before. “It was twenty-seven feet long . . . [w]ith a shattering roar and a 
cloud of smoke that hazed the sky, the mighty bullet was propelled across the 
open countryside for a mile before burying itself six feet down in the soft earth.”2 
The introduction of the cannon’s massive technological development, 
coupled with thousands of lesser cannons, brought about the end of the 
Byzantine Empire and, the Eastern Roman Empire, which had been established 
in the fourth century by Constantine the Great. “By nightfall on Monday, May 
28, [1453,] the great guns had been firing at the land walls for forty-seven days,”3 
causing the city’s defenses to collapse. The Ottomans conquered 
Constantinople, sacking it and the treasures it housed, renaming it Istanbul. For 
the Western world, “the consequences were religious, military, economic, and 
psychological.”4 The unimaginable became reality because of a technological 
breakthrough underappreciated by the defenders of Constantinople, but readily 
utilized by those able to afford and employ its advantages. 
The utilization of assisted reproductive technology (ART), among those able 
to afford it, has been no less abrupt or consequential. As with all technological 
developments, there has been an evolution. Even though surrogacy was 
practiced among the Hebrews, as described in the Hebrew Scriptures,5 artificial 
insemination, another variant of ART, has been utilized since the late 18th 
century, and was characterized as artificial insemination in the 19th century.6 By 
the 1970s, a third procedure became available, in vitro fertilization (IVF), which 
describes a procedure in which an egg is fertilized outside of a woman’s body 
and is then inserted into any woman’s womb for gestation.7 These assisted 
reproductive technologies precipitated businesses, such as fertility clinics, and 
the use of cryopreservation, also known as banking. Banking is a process that 
                                                          
 1 ROGER CROWLEY, 1453: THE HOLY WAR FOR CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE CLASH OF 
ISLAM AND THE WEST 5-6 (2005). 
 2 Id. at 93-94. 
 3 Id. at 203. 
 4 Id. at 241. 
 5 See Genesis 16:2 (Hagar, a surrogate, giving birth to Abraham’s child because his 
wife, Sarah, was barren). 
 6 See Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination 1890-1945, 87 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 592-93 (2012). 
 7 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7 
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 37, 44 (1995). 
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enables the preservation of sperm, eggs, and embryos for possible future 
implantation into a woman for gestation.8 
Fertility clinics, cryopreservation of human reproductive materials, and the 
increasing number of persons employing their services, precipitated legal 
disputes involving the clinics, state agencies, and the clients themselves. These 
disputes arose out of posthumous conception and its effect on state and federal 
benefits; such as whether the preserved human products constituted divisible 
marital property upon divorce, whether wrongful death law suits are applicable 
when an embryo is destroyed. Increasing concern over the religious, ethical and 
sociological issues involving these human reproductive materials, the donors, 
and any child born as a result.9 Eventually, ethical and moral commentary 
developed as religious, government, and advocacy groups became aware of the 
technological possibilities surrounding assisted reproduction.  For example, by 
the mid-1970s the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) 
appointed an ethics advisory board to study IVF and review proposals for 
funding IVF research.10 That ethics advisory board was soon disbanded in 1980, 
with oversight shifting to the Food and Drug Administration in 1998,11 where it 
remains today. Congress continues to annually renew the Dickey-Wicker 
amendment to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
appropriations bill, which prohibits federal funding “for research that creates 
embryos for research purposes or destroys, discards, or subjects an embryo to 
risks with no prospect of medical benefit for the embryo.”12 
Commentators and religious organizations continue to offer opinions on the 
ethical and moral uses of developing technologies involving assisted 
reproduction.13 There is indirect federal supervision of the fertility industry 
through the Food and Drug Administration, which regulates testing 
                                                          
 8 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITIES—THE 
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES, 29-30 (2004). 
 9 See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 533-34 (Iowa 2018) (holding that surrogacy 
contracts do not violate public morals); Morrissey v. U.S., 871 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 
2017) (acknowledging that ART involves multiple moral and ethical issues affecting 
divergent interests). 
 10 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS. ENG’G MED., MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES: 
ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 60 (Anne Claiborne et al. eds., 2016). 
 11 See id. (EAB no longer functioned in 1980, but the regulations required a federal 
ethics board). 
 12 Id. at 62; see also 45 C.F.R § 46.204(d); see generally MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2685 
(2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216(a). 
 13 See, e.g., Justo Aznar et al., Moral Assessment of Frozen Human Embryo Adoption in 
the Light of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, 23 ACTA BIOETHICA 137, 138 (2017) 
(discussing moral evaluation of embryo adoption in the Catholic Church); Ainsley J. 
Newton et al., Ethical and Legal Issues in Mitochondrial Transfer, 8 EMBO MOLECULAR 
MED. 589, 589 (2016); Kevin H. Theriot & Ken Connelly, Free to Do No Harm: 
Conscience Protections for Healthcare Professionals, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 549, 551-52 (2017). 
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requirements for donated human tissues including eggs and sperm.14 Finally, the 
Federal Trade Commission is charged with promoting truth in advertising clinic 
success rates.15 
In 1978, the first baby was born as a result of IVF technology; only a few 
decades ago.16 The baby, Louise Joy Brown may have been the first baby born 
as a result of IVF, but she was certainly not the last.17 Forty years later, 7 million 
children are the product of this form of medical technology and “the world’s 
fertility clinics have blossomed into a $17 billion business.”18 Undoubtedly, 
individuals and couples utilizing assisted reproduction will increase as insurance 
begins paying for procedures heretofore reserved to those who could afford 
them.19 In addition, medical advances will not abate and new reproductive 
technologies will challenge “our collective notions about family and the 
significance of biology in assigning parental rights.”20 
One response to the technological challenge presented by ART is the approval 
of a revised Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2017.21 The revised Act includes a 
new article, Article 9, addressing the right of children born through assisted 
reproductive technology to access medical and identifying information 
regarding any gamete providers.22 Article 9 does not require disclosure of the 
identity of a gamete donor, but it does require gamete banks and fertility clinics 
to ask donors if they want to have their identifying information disclosed when 
                                                          
 14 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, Reproduction and Responsibility: The 
Regulation of New Biotechnologies, 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/chapter
2.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 15 See Jillian Casey et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
83, 84 n.5 (2016) (the Federal Trade Commission is charged with promoting truth in 
advertising clinic success rates under the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1988). 
 16 Ariana Eunjung Cha, Happy birthday, Louise Brown! 40 years after the first IVF 
baby, 8 million more and counting, WASH. POST (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/07/25/happy-birthday-
louise-brown-40-years-after-the-first-ivf-baby-8-million-more-and-counting. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Valarie Blake, It’s an ART Not a Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried 
Persons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 653 (2011). 
 20 Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Contract Law, Reproductive Technology, and 
the Market: Families in the Age of ART, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 420 (2017). 
 21 Courtney Joslin & Jamie Pedersen, Updated National Uniform Parentage ACT (UPA 
2017) Approved, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (Nov. 12, 2017), 
https://www.sart.org/news-and-publications/news-and-research/legally-speaking/updated-
national-uniform-parentage-act-upa-2017-approved. 
 22 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 905 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2017). 
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the resulting child attains 18 years of age.23 However, it does require disclosure 
of non-identifying medical history of the gamete donor.24 The newly approved 
code also purposely revised paternity presumptions, acknowledgements, genetic 
testing, and assisted reproduction provisions to make them gender neutral.25 
Finally, the surrogacy provisions recommended in the Act were updated to make 
them more consistent with modern surrogacy practice.26 Additional codes, 
practices, and judicial holdings will increasingly accommodate the ascendant 
use of assisted reproductive technology. 
Building upon reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination 
(whether by donor or by husband), IVF, and traditional or gestational surrogacy, 
technology has evolved to the point whereby it is possible for a child to be born 
with more than two genetic parents.27 On April 6, 2016, a baby boy was born in 
Mexico through mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT) using the genetic 
material of three different people.28 Lawsuits involving multiple parental claims 
pertaining to the same child have proliferated in recent decades. Most of these 
claims rely on equitable or contractual causes of action to establish parental 
rights over the child.29 However, technology is now available to permit a child 
to have a genetic relationship with more than two adults. Viewed from a 
perspective of the brief time period between the use of artificial insemination 
and IVF, the reality of three-genetic parents is startling. 
As judicial disputes and commentary reveal, there currently exists uncertainty 
in how to address this technological development resulting in multiple genetic 
parents.30 The unique status of a human being is at stake. While “the UK has 
taken steps towards explicit authorization of the [mitochondrial replacement] 
procedure for use in clinical research, it remains effectively banned or heavily 
                                                          
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. § 802 cmt. (explaining how this section is based on newly developed 
surrogacy law in several states). 
 27 See Daniel Green, Assessing Parental Rights for Children with Genetic Material from 
Three Parents, 19 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 251, 251 (2018) (explaining how a baby was 
born with the genetic material of three people). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Raymond C. O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, 66 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 363, 385-87 (2016) (describing de facto, contractual, and equitable parentage). 
 30 See Ruth L. Fischbach et al., Creating a Three-Parent Child: An Educational. 
Paradigm for the Responsible Conduct of Research., 15 J. OF MICROBIOLOGY & BIOLOGY 
EDUC. 186, 188 (2014) (admitting there are questions surrounding new reproductive 
technology that the legal system needs to address); see also Green supra note 27, at 260 
(explaining there are four tests that courts commonly use to resolve parentage disputes: “the 
application of state statutes and public policy, basing the decision on the best interests of the 
child, assigning parentage based on genetic relationship to the child, and assigning parental 
rights based on the intent of the potential parents”). 
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restricted in many parts of the world, including most of Europe, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, among others.”31 Experience suggests 
that this is a current cautionary approach, but the reality is that the technology is 
there and it will be utilized both in reference to multiple genetic parents, but also 
for what is yet to come. 
Undoubtedly, the possibility of multiple genetic parents challenges the 
traditional status of motherhood, family, personhood, and intercourse between a 
man and a woman.32 However, this technological challenge will not abate the 
opportunity of scientific advances.33 One commentator provides an assessment: 
“Public law cannot anticipate the bounds of science in the formation of family 
and is not equipped to respond to the myriad questions that go along with cultural 
shifts. But what is clear is that as technology continues to evolve, a growing 
disconnect between law and technology is inevitable.”34 
This Article does not seek to address all of the issues developing around 
assisted reproductive technology. For example, the technology used in ART has 
created what some have called, the “Wild West of American medicine.”35 Such 
technological advances challenge historical, sociological, and religious 
underpinnings of family.36 Different assisted reproductive technologies, “such 
as ova donation, sperm donation, and gestational surrogacy, typically involving 
between three and four parties, present a more complicated landscape because 
they fragment the roles of the presumptive, genetic, gestational, and intentional 
parents.”37 
This Article provides a current assessment of assisted reproductive 
technology to understand and address what society must do next. To accomplish 
such a goal this Article is divided into four parts. First, this Article provides 
statistics on the current utilization of the many forms of technological assistance 
employed by single persons, married, and unmarried couples seeking to become 
parents. Second, public perception of surrogacy continues to evolve, and this 
                                                          
 31 G. Owen Schaefer & Markus K. Labude, Genetic Affinity and the Right to ‘Three-
Parent IVF,’ 34 J. ASST. REPROD. GENET. 1577, 1577 (2017). 
 32 See generally Zalesne, supra note 20, at 419, 487. 
 33 See generally id. 
 34 Id. at 481. 
 35 Karen Wright, Human in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, DISCOVER (May 1, 
1998), http://discovermagazine.com/1998/may/humanintheageofm1443. 
 36 See Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive 
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 108 
(2014) (citing Judith F. Daar, The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or 
Dooming the Species?, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 514 (2003)) (noting that as a result of 
assisted reproductive technology, there is still complex, legal, and societal questions yet to 
be answered). 
 37 Id. at 115; see also Green, supra note 27 (discussing the three relevant relationships 
courts have identified when identifying parents). 
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Article discusses the judicial and legislative pronouncements both supporting 
and forbidding the practice of surrogacy. Third, the technology that makes ART 
possible has also precipitated separate legal issues that continue to involve 
judicial and legislative action. Among these issues are posthumous conception, 
distribution or destruction of genetic materials, and parentage.38 Any exhaustive 
treatment of any of these issues is beyond the scope of this particular Article. 
But a current assessment is possible and needed; one that speaks to how the issue 
is currently being addressed. This discussion illustrates the extent to which 
ARTs have influenced the law. Finally, this Article assess what is currently 
being decided regarding technological procedures resulting in a child being born 
with more than two genetically related parents. 
The technological advances made in the last fifty years pertaining to human 
reproduction have been both rapid and challenging. Concomitant with these 
advances has been the increasing utilization of assisted means of reproduction 
by persons and couples able to afford the expensive and risky procedures. 
Legislatures are challenged to provide objective, deliberative guidance; funding 
organizations, both private and government, must balance the fact that human 
life is involved against the goal of medical advancement; courts must balance 
standards of public policy against the complaints made by individuals in pursuit 
of reproductive autonomy. This Article involves items of grave concern, seeking 
only to offer an assessment of where we are presently, amidst these 
technological changes. 
I. UTILIZATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
A number of national organizations work together to provide commentators 
with nationwide statistics derived from ART surveillance.39 Reporting is 
mandated by the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 
(FCSRCA), enacted by Congress, which requires all clinics performing ART in 
the United States to annually report their success rate data to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).40 These fertility clinics rely upon the 
                                                          
 38 See generally Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785 (Conn. 2011) (explaining that the 
law is not as advanced as the scientific technology behind assisted reproductive technology 
and providing an example of a dispute over parentage). 
 39 Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United 
States, 2015, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (2018) (describing the National ART Surveillance System developed by the 
CDC in which “clinics […] that are members of the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART) can report their data to NASS through SART”). 
 40 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a(a); Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (1992); 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-5. This law is the only 
federal law regulating the infertility industry in the United States, but the Clinical 
Laboratories Improvement Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a, provides for federal 
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National ART Surveillance System (NASS), which is a web-based data 
collection system used by all ART clinics, to report data for each ART procedure 
to the CDC.41 The data collected is then used to guide physicians, advocacy 
groups, and possible patients in decision-making. The CDC, the Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, and the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
work with other groups, such as the National Infertility Association and 
Path2Parenthood to amass statistics on procedures and the use of ARTs.42 The 
number and variety of these organizations illustrate the scope of technological 
reproductive procedures increasingly utilized by a diverse range of citizens. 
The National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 
Division of Reproductive Health (National Center), publishes an annual national 
report on the use of ART in the United States.43 Utilizing data provided by 
multiple reporting fertility clinics, the National Report provides data that “can 
give potential ART patients an idea of the average chances of success.”44 
Likewise, the data also provides insight into the utilization of ART, the evolution 
of ART procedures, and the trends within this medical process.45 In addition, the 
CDC collects and publishes data on an annual basis since 2004.46 The National 
Report is submitted two years after the data is assembled and analyzed.47 For 
example, the 2013 Report was published in 2015.48 To provide an assessment of 
trends and current parameters, this Article will focus on three years of numerical 
statistics provided by the National Report, the years 2013-2015. 
A. Statistical Trends 
1. ART Cycles and Births 
The United States Code defines assisted reproductive technology as any 
treatment or procedure that includes the handling of human eggs or embryos, 
                                                          
certification of clinical laboratory. 
 41 Sunderam, supra note 39. 
 42 See National ART Surveillance, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html. 
 43 See ART Success Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 16, 
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html [hereinafter CDC ART Success]. 
 44 See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2015 Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: National Summary Report at 3 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-
report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2015 CDC Report]. 
 45 Id. at 3-5. 
 46 Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 
13, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/archive.html. 
 47 CDC ART Success, supra note 43. 
 48 See generally CDC ART Success, supra note 43. 
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which encompasses many procedures today.49 Recent technological advances 
made assisted reproduction possible on a scale not imagined a century ago. 
Generally, ART involves combining sperm with ova that has been surgically 
removed from a woman’s body and then returning the resulting embryos—
fertilized eggs—to the woman’s uterus or donating the produced embryos to 
another woman or couple.50 In addition, the eggs, the semen, or the embryos 
may be “banked” with a fertility clinic for potential use in the future.51 While 
this may be the most common, this is not the only form of ART.52 
References throughout this Article are made to ART cycles and a description 
of what this entails illustrates the level of technology now available, and also 
provides a glimpse into that which lies ahead. An ART cycle begins when a 
woman commences taking medication to stimulate her ovaries so that they will 
develop eggs or, if no drugs are given, when the woman begins having her 
ovaries monitored (using ultrasound or blood tests) for natural egg production.53 
If eggs are produced then the cycle progresses to egg retrieval, which involves a 
surgical procedure to collect those eggs from the woman’s ovaries.54 In 2015, as 
seen in preceding years, the overwhelming majority of cases involving the 
cancellation of the ART cycle, was due to insufficient egg production, or no egg 
production at all.55 
Once eggs are retrieved, the woman’s eggs are combined with sperm in a 
laboratory with the intent to fertilize the eggs.56 If this is successful then the 
resulting embryos become available and one or more are selected for transfer, 
most often into a woman’s uterus through the cervix (IVF), but sometimes into 
the fallopian tubes (GIFT or ZIFT).57 Transfer usually occurs within six days 
after retrieval, though transfers occurring five days after retrieval have higher 
                                                          
 49 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-7. 
 50 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 8, 10. 
 51 Id. at 51. 
 52 Infertility FAQ, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/index.htm. 
 53 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2014 Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: National Summary Report at 12 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/2014/national-summary.html [hereinafter 2014 CDC 
Report]. 
 54 See generally In vitro fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716. 
 55 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 14. 
 56 Id. at 13. 
 57 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53 (stating that in 2014, there were 92,862 cycles 
started, 83,114 retrievals, 67,070 transfers, 30,647 pregnancies, and 25,016 live-birth 
deliveries. Additionally, of these transfers, in 83% of cases, one or two embryos were 
transferred to the woman. One embryo was transferred 28.8% of the time, while two were 
transferred 54.1% of the time. In general, multiple embryos resulting in multiple fetus 
pregnancies raise the risk of premature birth, low birth weight, and pregnancy 
complications). 
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live-birth percentages, assuming that the embryo survives that long.58 The goal 
of the ART cycle is for one or more of the transferred embryos to implant within 
the woman’s uterus and achieve a clinical pregnancy.59 The hope is that this 
clinical pregnancy will progress to a live birth. As stated previously, in the 
majority of cases there is not enough egg production to proceed and more than 
82% of cycles were cancelled in 2014 for this reason.60 However, in more than 
11% (12.5% in 2015)61 of the cases reported, the patient withdraws from the 
process for other reasons.62 
Success rates for ART cycles have increased slightly since the CDC began 
monitoring data in 1995.63 A consistent pattern indicates that a “woman’s age is 
the most important factor for having a live birth when her own eggs are used.”64 
On the other hand, when donor eggs are used, women aged 40 or older generally 
have much higher percentages of live births.65 To illustrate, in 2015, of the ART 
cycles that used frozen eggs from a donor and a fresh embryo, 6% resulted in 
cancellations, 47% in pregnancies, 39% in live births, and 30% in single infant 
births.66 
In 2013, the National Center collected data from 467 fertility clinics then in 
operation and able to verify data submitted.67 These clinics reported in 2013, that 
the number of ART cycles performed in the United States increased 25% from 
2004 to 2013,68 for a total of 190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013.69 From 
these cycles “[t]he number of infants born who were conceived using ART 
increased from 49,458 in 2004 to 66,706 in 2013.”70 The CDC reports that in 
2013 approximately 1.5% of all infants born in the United States were conceived 
                                                          
 58 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 37-38. 
 59 Id. 
 60 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 13. 
 61 Id.; 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 14. 
 62 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 13. 
 63 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 7. 
 64 Id. at 21. 
 65 Id. at 22. 
 66 Id. at 12. 
 67 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2013 Assisted Reproductive 
Technology: National Summary Report, at 3 (2015), 
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf [hereinafter 2013 
CDC Report]. 
 68 Id. at 49 (defining Assisted Reproductive Technology as: “All treatments or 
procedures that include the handling of human eggs or embryos to help a woman become 
pregnant. ART includes but is not limited to in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete 
intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), tubal embryo transfer, 
egg and embryo cryopreservation, egg and embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy.”). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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using some form of ART.71 Because more than one infant may be born during a 
live-birth delivery (for example, twins), the total number of infants born will be 
greater than the number of ART cycles performed.72 In addition, the number of 
ART cycles using eggs or embryos not genetically related to the parent(s) who 
will raise the child increased 32% between 2004 and 2013.73 This figure 
indicates greater reliance upon donor eggs or embryos when seeking parenthood. 
From 2005 through 2014 the number of ART cycles performed in the United 
States has increased 26%, and the number of live births in 2014 was almost one 
and a half times higher than in 2005.74 Likewise, the number of infants born who 
were conceived using ART increased from 52,041 in 2005 to 68,791 in 2014.75  
By 2014, the number of fertility clinics within the United States rose to 498 and 
the number of clinics submitting data was 458.76 ART cycles performed at these 
clinics rose to 208,604 in 2014, a substantial increase from the 190,773 recorded 
in 2013.77 The CDC reports that “[t]he number of clinics, cycles performed, live-
birth deliveries, and infants born as a result of ART have all increased steadily 
since CDC began collecting this information in 1995.”78 Indeed, by 2014 the 
“CDC estimates that ART accounts for slightly less than 2% of total US 
births.”79 
By 2015, there were 464 clinics reporting data and 231,936 ART cycles were 
performed at these reporting clinics.80 As a result of the ART cycles performed 
in 2015, 72,913 infants were born, a dramatic increase from the previous year.81 
From 2005 through 2014, the percentage of transfers using fresh nondonor 
eggs or embryos that resulted in single-infant live births increased from 28% in 
2005 to 35% in 2014 for women younger than 35 (the percentage rose in every 
other age group as well).82 This increasing trend continued in 2015, when 39% 
of ART cycles used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos.83 Parties participating in 
                                                          
 71 Casey et al., supra note 15, at 86 (citing 2013 ART Fertility Success Rates: Latest 
Data, 2013). 
 72 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 7. 
 73 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 50. 
 74 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 49 (stating that from 1993 to 2013 the use of 
ART in the United States tripled); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
2011 Assisted Reproductive Technology: National Summary Report at 8 (2013), 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2011-report/fertility-clinic/art_2011_clinic_report-full.pdf 
[hereinafter 2011 CDC Report]. 
 75 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 49. 
 76 Id. at 7. 
 77 Id. at 3; see also 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 5. 
 78 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 7. 
 79 Id. 
 80 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 3. 
 81 Id. at 3. 
 82 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 54. 
 83 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44 at 8. 
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the ART cycles who intended to become parents through ART may have 
contributed to a higher probability of having a child even when there were other 
adverse conditions present.84 The fertility clinics’ data reports that “[o]f the 
190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013 at these reporting clinics, 163,209 cycles 
(86%) were started with the intent to transfer at least one embryo.85 These 
163,209 cycles resulted in 54,323 live births (deliveries of one or more living 
infants) and 67,996 infants.”86 Furthermore, “[i]n 2013, the percentage of ART 
cycles resulting in live births was higher than the national percentage for patients 
with ovulatory dysfunction, endometriosis, male factor, or unknown factor 
infertility; it was lower for patients with tubal factor, diminished ovarian reserve, 
uterine factor, ‘other’ factor, or multiple infertility factors.”87 
2. Cryopreservation 
Cryopreservation involves the practice of freezing eggs or embryos from a 
patient’s ART cycle for potential future use.88 Whenever frozen (cryopreserved) 
embryos are thawed and transferred to a woman, this is referred to as a “frozen 
embryo cycle.”89 The use of frozen nondonor embryos are both less expensive 
and less invasive because the woman does not have to go through the fertility 
drug stimulation and egg retrieval process again.90 
During 2013, of the 163,209 ART cycles started with the intent to transfer at 
least one embryo, “2,655 cycles were reported with the intent to thaw a 
previously frozen egg, fertilize the egg, and then transfer the resulting 
embryo.”91 In addition, in the same year, “27,564 cycles (14%) were started with 
the intent of cryopreserving (freezing) and storing all resulting eggs or embryos 
for potential future use.”92 The “banking” or cryopreservation of fresh nondonor 
                                                          
 84 Id. at 22. 
 85 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67 at 3. 
 86 Id. (stating that an “ART cycle is started when a woman begins taking medication to 
stimulate the ovaries to develop eggs or, if no drugs are given, when the woman begins 
having her ovaries monitored (using ultrasound or blood tests) for natural egg production.”); 
2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 63 (“ART cycles include any process in which (1) an 
ART procedure is performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring 
with the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed with 
the intent of transferring them to a woman.”). 
 87 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 25. 
 88 Id. at 61. 
 89 Id. at 62. 
 90 Mary Ellen Pavone et al., Comparing thaw survival, Implantation and live births from 
cryopreserved zygotes, embryos and blastocysts, J. HUM. REPROD. SCI., 23-28 (2011),  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3136065. 
 91 2013 CDC REPORT, supra note 67, at 3. 
 92 Id. 
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eggs or embryos increased dramatically from 2004 through 2013, approaching 
nearly 30,000.93 
By 2014, there were 208,604 cycles started, and of these cycles 173,198 of 
them were started with the intent of transferring at least one embryo.94 Of this 
number, there were 3,596 cycles reported with the intent to thaw a previously 
frozen egg, fertilize the egg, and then transfer the resulting embryo.95 However, 
the majority of persons choosing cryopreservation did so to store all eggs or 
embryos for potential future use, a practice referred to as banking.96 In 2014, 
27% of all ART cycles used frozen nondonor embryos,97 the number rising to 
30% in 2015.98 Between 2005 and 2014, banking of nondonor eggs for future 
use increased dramatically.99 The increase in banking continued in 2015 with 
20% of the 231,936 ART cycles initiated with the intent of cryopreserving and 
storing all resulting eggs or embryos for potential future use.100 
Cryopreservation is increasingly utilized in the technological process of ART. 
In about 49% of ART cycles performed in 2013 fresh (non-frozen) nondonor 
eggs or embryos were used.101 ART cycles that used frozen nondonor embryos 
were the next most common type, accounting for 25% of the total.102 The 
percentages of transfers from a total of 46,779 ART cycles resulting in 
pregnancies, live births and single-infant live births were higher for frozen 
nondonor embryos than for fresh nondonor embryos in 2013.103 However, note 
that the percentages of transfers resulting in pregnancies, live births, and single-
infant live births were lower for transfers using frozen donor embryos compared 
with fresh donor embryos.104 While the statistics may be anesthetizing, they 
point to the increased utilization of ART, by a wider range of patients, and the 
                                                          
 93 Id. at 50 (stating that the freezing of embryos for possible future use is controversial 
because of an embryo’s potential for life); see, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 20, at 461-67; 
Theriot & Connelly, supra note 13, at 560-63. 
 94 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 3. 
 95 Id. at 3, 55 (quoting “From 2005 through 2014, transfers of one embryo more than 
tripled from 9% to almost 29%.”). 
 96 Id. at 3. 
 97 Id. at 8. 
 98 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 8. 
 99 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 50. 
 100 2015 CDC REPORT, supra note 44, at 3 (“Banking continues to be a subject of 
concern. Some argue that the woman who banks her eggs disrespects the sacredness of 
motherhood, while others argue that given “her particular circumstances, if a woman 
believes that freezing her embryos is the best way to bring about . . . future flourishing, 
respecting the dignity of motherhood does not warrant interference.”); Zalesne, supra note 
20, at 463; but see John S. Grabowski & Christopher Gross, Dignitas Personae and the 
Adoption of Frozen Embryos, 10 NAT’L. CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 307, 309 (2010). 
 101 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 8. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 43. 
 104 Id. at 43, 46. 
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varied forms of technological procedures now available. 
3. Age as a Factor in Utilizing ART 
All of the data provided by the CDC since reporting started in 1995, concludes 
that the likelihood of a successful response to ovarian stimulation and 
progression to egg retrieval decreases as a woman grows older.105 In addition, 
whenever egg retrieval is successful, the eggs are less likely to reach the transfer 
phase, and even if successful, it is less likely to result in pregnancy or live birth 
because the possibility of miscarriage increases as a woman ages.106 To 
illustrate, in 2014, 37% of all cycles involving women younger than 35 resulted 
in live births, but that percentage drops to 1% for women older than 44.107 
Consistent among most age groups was the fact that ART cycles using fresh 
nondonor eggs or embryos resulting in live births was lower among women who 
previously had one or more unsuccessful ART cycles.108 This is because as a 
woman ages the likelihood of a successful response to ovarian stimulation and 
progression to egg retrieval decreases (there is also less likelihood of a 
successful transfer, pregnancy, and live birth).109 The CDC has reported that “a 
woman’s age is the most important factor for having a live birth when her own 
eggs are used.”110  Often cycles that progress to pregnancy result in 
miscarriage.111 In contrast, women using donor eggs had a much higher 
percentages of live births no matter what their age, since the egg donors are 
typically in their 20s and 30s.112 “The percentage of cycles performed with donor 
eggs increased sharply after age 40. Among women older than age 48, for 
example, approximately 90% of all ART cycles used donor eggs, of which more 
than two-thirds used frozen embryos created from donor eggs.”113 
The “average age of women using ART services in 2013 was 36,”114 but it 
should be noted that this is the average age—the largest group of women using 
ART being younger than 35 (38%).115 Around “20% of ART cycles were 
performed among women aged 35-37, 19% among women 38-40, 11% among 
                                                          
 105 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 24; see also Sunderam, supra note 39. 
 106 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 23. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 28. 
 109 Id. at 23. 
 110 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 21. 
 111 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 22. 
 112 Id. at 46. 
 113 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 46. 
 114 Id. at 9 (In 2015 the average age was slightly more than 35 and the median age was 
35. Nearly 65% of all women utilizing ART cycles in 2015 were women aged 30-39). 
 115 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 9. 
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women aged 41-42, 7% among women aged 43-44, and 5% among women older 
than 44.”116 The age of the woman continues to be a major factor in determining 
whether the ART cycle will result in a live birth.117 “Overall, 40% of cycles 
started in 2013 among women younger than age 35 resulted in live births. “This 
percentage decreased to 32% among women aged 35-37, 21% among women 
aged 38-40, 11% among women aged 41-42, 5% among women aged 43-44, and 
2% among women older than age 44.”118 
In 2013 and 2014, the average age of women using ART was 36 years-of-
age.119 However, women less than 35 years-of-age represented approximately 
38% of all ART cycles performed in that year: 20% of ART cycles were 
performed among women aged 35-37, 19% among women aged 38-40, 10% 
among women aged 41-42, 7% among women aged 43-44, and 6% among 
women older than 44.120 The percentages of “fresh nondonor cycles performed 
were greater than frozen nondonor cycles in all age groups. Percentages of fresh 
or frozen donor cycles were about the same in younger age groups.”121 While 
older age groups typically undergo frozen donor cycles more than fresh donor 
cycles.122 
4. Embryos Transferred 
Of the ART cycles studied that used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos in 2013, 
“36% of cycles resulted in clinical pregnancy; about 24% resulted in a single-
fetus pregnancy, 10% [resulted] in a multiple-fetus pregnancy, and 2% [of this 
group resulted] in a pregnancy where the number of fetuses could not be 
determined.”123 In addition, about “82% of the pregnancies resulted in a live 
birth (about 60% in the birth of a single infant and 22% in the birth of multiple 
infants).”124 Meanwhile, “about 17% of pregnancies resulted in miscarriage, 
stillbirth, abortion, or maternal death prior to birth.”125 Additionally, it should 
be noted that “single-infant births have a lower risk than multiple-infant births 
for poor infant health outcomes, including prematurity, low birth weight, 
                                                          
 116 Id. 
 117 Hye Ok Kim et al., Predictors of Live Birth and Pregnancy Success After in Vitro 
Fertilization in Infertile Women Aged 40 and Over, CLINICAL EXPERIMENTAL REPROD. 
MED., June 2017, at 111. 
 118 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 23. 
 119 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 9. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 10. 
 122 Id. 
 123 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 15. 
 124 Id. at 16. 
 125 Id. 
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disability, and death.”126 This finding is consistent throughout the data and 
recent reports find similar results. The “percentage of transfers of fresh nondonor 
eggs or embryos in 2014 resulting in the live birth of a single, term, and normal 
birth weight infant decreased as the number of embryos transferred 
increased.”127 Indeed, the 2014 data revealed that “the percentage of single-
infant live births was highest with the transfer of one embryo (98%).”128 
Likewise, in 2015 data concluded that the “percentage of transfers resulting in 
the live birth of a single, term, and normal birth weight infant decreased from 
approximately 30% among cycles that involved the transfer of one embryo to 
11% among cycles that involved the transfer of four or more embryos.”129 
In 2013, the majority of ART cycles that used fresh nondonor eggs or embryos 
and that progressed to the embryo transfer stage involved the transfer of one 
(23.6%) or two (55.7%) embryos.130 Almost 21% of transfers involved three or 
more embryos, 6% involved four or more embryos, and 2% of transfers involved 
five or more embryos.131 Once an egg is retrieved for fertilization and then 
fertilized, the resulting embryo may be transferred into the woman’s uterus 
anytime in the next 1 to 6 days, the most common were transfers after three or 
five days.132 Furthermore, “[t]he percentage of transfers resulting in the live birth 
of a single, term, and normal birth weight infant decreased as the number of 
embryos transferred increased.”133 
5. Gestational Carriers/Surrogates 
Often a surrogate134 is used to carry a child to term, using her own eggs or 
eggs from a donor. Between 2005 and 2014 the number of ART cycles using a 
gestational carrier nearly doubled in number.135 “The percentage of transfers 
using a gestational carrier among all transfers also increased, from about 2% in 
2005 to about 3% in 2014.”136 
                                                          
 126 Id. at 53. 
 127 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 33. 
 128 Id. at 35. 
 129 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 34. 
 130 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 31. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 36. 
 133 Id. at 33. 
 134 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1-2) cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017) (defining a surrogate as a woman who is not an intended parent and who 
agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction using her own gametes (genetic 
surrogate) or gametes that are not her own (gestational surrogate)). 
 135 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 52. 
 136 Id. 
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In 2013, data reported to the CDC showed, the “percentages of transfers that 
resulted in live births were higher among gestational carrier [surrogates] cycles 
in all age groups except older than age 44.”137 Gestational carriers were used in 
about 1% of fresh nondonor ART cycles in 2013 (822 cycles) and similarly in 
2014.138 Overall, the percentage of live births when using a gestational carrier 
was 8% higher among women younger than age 35, 4% higher among women 
aged 35-37, 10% higher among women aged 38-40, 12% higher among women 
aged 41-42, and 8% higher among women aged 43-44.139 There are similar 
statistics in both 2014 and 2015.140 
Greater acceptance of surrogacy agreements occurred following the famous 
1988 decision, In re Baby M, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
the genetic surrogacy agreement violated state public policy.141 Presently, the 
District of Columbia, New York, and only three other jurisdictions ban 
surrogacy outright.142 While seven states allow surrogacy through case law 
precedent, there are twenty-two states that statutorily permit surrogacy with 
certain limitations.143 Alternatively, twenty-one states remain silent on the 
issue.144   
B. Financial Cost of ART 
1. Cycles 
Because of location, the health status of participants, and the extent of 
treatment options, it is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the cost of 
an ART cycle. One study estimates that the cost of one IVF treatment, often not 
covered by the few insurance policies that do cover infertility treatments, is 
$12,500.145 Costs for achieving a live birth can range from $66,000 to 
$114,000.146 
One published report provides that: 
IVF treatment costs can vary widely depending on age, medical history, 
location, and the number of accessible fertility clinics. According to 
                                                          
 137 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 41. 
 138 Id.; 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 41. 
 139 2013 CDC Report, supra note 67, at 41. 
 140 See 2014 CDC Report, supra note 53, at 41; 2015 CDC Report, supra note 44, at 42. 
 141 Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988). 
 142 Zalesne, supra note 20, at 429. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Katie Falloon & Philip M. Rosoff, Who Pays? Mandate Insurance Coverage for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 63, 63 (2014). 
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RESOLVE, the National Infertility Association, the average cost of a 
single IVF cycle using fresh embryos is $8,158—not including 
medications. Each IVF treatment cycle is a multistep process, in which 
eggs are extracted, fertilized with sperm in a lab, then placed in the 
uterus once the embryo develops to a certain point. The fertility drugs 
that release the hormones that boost egg production and make the uterus 
more receptive to embryo implantation can vary from $60 to $6,000 per 
cycle.147  
Some commentators predict that competition among clinics, plus increased 
technological efficiency over time, will eventually drive the prices down, as 
happens with most new technologies.148 Indeed, it is arguable that the increasing 
use of assisted reproductive technology and greater access to financing, work in 
tandem. “In most cases, the market is a necessary catalyst for technological 
change—commercialization is what propels technological advancements 
forward.”149 
At least one organization, RESOLVE, provides assistance in making 
resources accessible to persons seeking to use fertility services, establishing a 
network of support, and advocating on behalf of fertility options. RESOLVE is 
a non-profit organization, founded in 1974, that is certified under the National 
Health Council Standards of Excellence.150 It describes itself as the national 
fertility association and seeks to provide help to those who may be victimized 
by unequal access due to the high cost of treatments that is often not covered by 
insurance.151 RESOLVE offers many aspects of infertility response.152 For 
example, it provides access to information about area support groups, available 
insurance coverage, legislative advocacy, and advice on the ways to address 
infertility.153 
                                                          
 147 In Vitro Fertilization Cost: Can you Afford IVF Treatment?, DISCOVER: Health and 
Family (Aug. 21, 2017) https://www.discover.com/personal-loans/resources/major-
expenses/fertility-costs/#_edn2 (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also State Laws Related to 
Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L. CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (April 27, 
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx 
(quoting the University of Iowa Stead Family Children’s Hospital study reporting that each 
cycle of IVF costs $12,000 to $17,000 on average). 
 148 See Zalesne, supra note 20, at 445. 
 149 Id. at 487; see also Jillian Casey et al., supra note 15, at 113-15 (discussing progress 
being made to supply insurance coverage for ART). 
 150 Fast Facts About Resolve: The National Infertility Association, RESOLVE, 
https://resolve.org/about-us/fast-facts-resolve-national-infertility-association/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2018). 
 151 Id.; Uddoh v. United Healthcare, 254 F. Supp. 3d 424, 426 (E.D. N.Y. 2017) 
(showing an example of insurance refusing to pay for fertility treatments). 
 152 Coping Techniques, RESOLVE, https://resolve.org/support/managing-infertility-
stress/coping-techniques/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 153 Id. 
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Location of fertility clinics is important because not only does the cost of 
infertility treatments vary among the states, so do the laws mandating insurance, 
treatment options, and religious exemptions for treatment of persons seeking 
infertility treatments.154 Legislatures are at the cusp of addressing issues of sex 
discrimination under Title VII and whether IVF should be encompassed within 
the purview of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).155 Similarly, the liberty 
interest guaranteed to same-sex couples under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges156 has yet to be fully explored.157 
There are also the ethical and moral issues to consider: “Though unsurprising, 
[the fact that access to ART is more accessible to the wealthy, than the poor] is 
morally problematic. If genetic reproduction is broadly believed to be of truly 
fundamental importance, then access to IVF in a just society would depend on 
need, not on morally irrelevant characteristics like wealth or education status.”158 
Meaning “[t]he service would be available to everyone who could medically 
benefit from it, rather than only to those who could pay for it.”159 Insurance 
mandates create “lower costs for ART services so that use of the technology 
would be based less on financial status.”160 The proven success of insurance 
mandates is shown in the fact that “ART is higher in states where insurance 
coverage . . . is mandatory.”161 
 
                                                          
 154 See, e.g., Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why 
Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 165-66 (2010); see generally Katherine Johnson, Charting 
Infertility in the Workplace: An Analysis of Hall v. Nalco and the Seventh Circuit’s 
Recognition of Sex Discrimination Based on In Vitro Fertilization, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1283, 1317-19 (2010); Gwenn Dobos, The Relevance of “Related”: Should “Related 
Medical Conditions” Include In Vitro Fertilization Under the PDA? - Hall v. Nalco, 534 
F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008), 78 U. CONN. L. REV. 399, 399 (2009). 
 155 See generally Johnson, supra note 157, at 1283, 1296; see generally Dobos, supra 
note 157 at 399. 
 156 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (holding that same-sex 
couples have a liberty interest under the United States Constitution to enter into marriage, 
and to have their marriages recognized by other states). 
 157 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1747 
(2018) (analyzing Obergefell in the context of First Amendment liberty rights and same-sex 
couples); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (reinforcing Obergefell by 
invalidating Arkansas statute that required the name of mother’s male spouse to appear on 
child’s birth certificate when mother conceived child by means of artificial insemination, 
but allowed omission of mother’s female spouse from child’s birth certificate under the 
same circumstances). 
 158 Falloon & Rosoff, supra note 146, at 64. 
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 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
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2. Insurance Coverage 
Commentators suggest that, in time, insurance coverage for fertility 
treatments will become increasingly available.162 “As use of ARTs become more 
widespread, consumers of insurance policies will begin to demand better 
coverage of fertility treatments.”163 However, there is not currently a universal 
state, or federal requirement that infertility be covered by insurance.164 Medicaid 
will not pay for infertility treatments, but Congress, as part of the fiscal year 
2018 budget, extended IVF services for qualified wounded veterans for another 
two years.165 Due to lack of public funding, ART is most often paid for with 
private funds, restricting treatments to wealthier individuals.166 
There are many reasons why mandated insurance coverage is appealing 
and why it would be desirable for this technology to be available to all 
those who want it. Infertility affects approximately 10 percent of 
couples at any given time worldwide, and the high cost of ART is a 
major barrier to its use [citation omitted]. National survey data indicate 
that insurance coverage and finances are the main factors in whether or 
not a woman seeks medical help to become pregnant. [citation omitted]. 
There is an 11 percent chance that low-income women will pursue 
ART, while high-income women are almost twice as likely to do so 
[citation omitted.]. It is therefore not surprising that those who have 
access to ART are wealthier and have had more education than the 
average person [citation omitted].167 
Currently, fifteen states have enacted legislation requiring that private 
insurance cover all or some of infertility treatment.168 The fifteen states include: 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas 
and West Virginia.169 The laws of these states also vary greatly, some requiring 
                                                          
 162 See generally Casey et al., supra note 15, at 123. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Falloon & Rosoff, supra note 146, at 63. 
 165 See SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., Congress Approves FY18 Budget; Extends 
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insurers to cover or offer coverage of infertility diagnosis and treatment. 
To illustrate differences among the states, California law requires group 
health care service plans to offer coverage for the treatment of infertility, except 
for in vitro fertilization.170 The law also accommodates religious beliefs by 
exempting employers from compliance if this would be inconsistent with the 
organization’s religious or ethical values.171 Arkansas, on the other hand, 
provides that all individual and group insurance policies that provide maternity 
benefits must cover IVF, including cryopreservation.172 Insurers may choose to 
include other infertility procedures or treatments under the IVF benefit; 
however, insurers relying upon the mandated coverage are required to meet the 
following standards: 
(1) there is a lifetime maximum of $15,000 for coverage; (2) the 
patient’s eggs must be fertilized with her husband’s sperm; (3) the 
patient has been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through any less 
costly infertility treatments covered by insurance; (4) the IVF procedure 
must be performed at a facility licensed or certified by the state in 
conformity with state law; (5) coverage is limited to preexisting 
conditions of 12 months; (6) the patient and her spouse must have at 
least a two year history of unexplained infertility or the infertility must 
be associated with at least one of the following: endometriosis, DES 
exposure, blocked or surgically removed fallopian tubes that are not the 
result of voluntary sterilization, or abnormal male factors contributing 
to the infertility.173 
However, New Jersey requires health insurers in the state to provide coverage 
for “medically necessary expenses incurred in the diagnosis and treatment of 
infertility.”174 This includes medications, and procedures, including “surgery, in 
vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian 
transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and 
four completed egg retrievals per lifetime of the covered person.”175 The law 
includes some restrictions as well as a religious exemption for employers that 
provide coverage to fewer than fifty employees.176 
Looking to the future, there is some indication that government will become 
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more proactive in mandating insurance coverage for fertility treatments. For 
example, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, as part of his agenda for his 2018 
Women’s Agenda for New York: Equal Rights, Equal Opportunity, announced 
plans to improve access to in vitro fertilization and fertility treatment services 
for New Yorkers.177 The governor directed the New York State Department of 
Financial Services to examine approaches for incorporating fertility treatments 
into what already exists under New York law.178 The governor cited statistics 
stating that approximately 12% of women between the ages of 18 and 44 years 
old struggle to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term.179 The Department of 
Financial Services is tasked with ensuring that all New Yorkers have access to 
infertility treatment and preservation services, regardless of sexual orientation 
or marital status.180 
Currently, New York state law prohibits individual and group health 
insurance policies from excluding coverage for hospital care, surgical care, and 
medical care for diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical conditions 
otherwise covered by the applicable policy, solely because the medical condition 
results in infertility.181 In 2002, the New York legislature amended state law to 
require certain insurers to cover infertility treatment for women between the ages 
of 21 and 44, but the law excludes coverage for in vitro fertilization, gamete 
intrafallopian tube transfers, and zygote intrafallopian tube transfers.182 Then in 
2011, New York law was further amended to mandate that every insurance 
policy provides coverage for prescription fertility drugs and permits these drugs 
to be purchased at all types of pharmacies.183 
II. SURROGACY 
Surrogacy as a parenting option has ancient roots, even biblical references,184 
but historically, surrogacy is distinctive in that the woman, not intending to be a 
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parent, agrees to become pregnant and carry a child to term using her own 
gamete under a genetic surrogacy agreement.185 The 2017 version of the UPA 
refers to this woman as a genetic surrogate.186 The fact that the woman is using 
her own gamete provides a heightened scrutiny and claim to parentage on her 
part. 
However, modern ART has expanded surrogacy options beyond genetic 
surrogacy, enabling a woman, not intending to be a parent, to become pregnant 
using gametes that are not her own under a surrogacy agreement.187 The 2017 
UPA refers to this woman as a gestational surrogate.188 Through IVF, adult 
parties may enter into “collaborative reproduction” arrangements whereby a 
surrogate may gestate a fetus using donor gametes.189 The surrogacy contract 
may include any of these assisted reproduction means, meant to cause 
pregnancy, other than through sexual intercourse, such as: (1) intrauterine or 
intracervical insemination; (2) donations of gametes; (3) donation of embryos; 
(4) in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; or (5) intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection.190 These technological advances far exceed the sole means envisioned 
in ancient times. 
Surrogates in the United States tend to live above the poverty level, have 
already given birth to at least one child, and have a stable, sensible lifestyle.191 
One profile describes a surrogate in the following fashion: married, Christian, 
middle-class, with two to three biological children, working a part-time job, 
living in a small town or suburb, rather than a big city, with at least some 
education from a higher institution, but usually a bachelor’s degree.192 In the 
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United States, statistics show that surrogates fall into the average household 
income category of under $60,000.193 About 15% to 20% of surrogates are 
military wives and some are single women.194  
“Of the women who serve as surrogates for CSP” (the Center for Surrogate 
Parenting) and “are married [to] husbands who support paid surrogacy . . . 
roughly 35 percent repeat the experience.”195 
A. Disparate Couples 
While surrogacy may have begun with an infertile married couple seeking to 
have a child with a biological connection to at least one spouse, that paradigm 
has expanded to include unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex couples. These 
two groups have expanded drastically in recent decades.196 Some argue that one 
reason why surrogacy has been increasingly accepted is because there has been 
a concomitant expansion of rights for the LGBTQ community, especially for 
gay men seeking to become parents through a biological connection.197 
However, opposite-sex nonmarital couples have also had an impact on 
surrogacy. One of the first decisions involving opposite-sex nonmarital partners 
involved the disposition of cryogenically-preserved sperm and whether public 
policy allowed the man to release his sperm to his nonmarital partner during his 
lifetime, or at his death.198 In Hecht v. Superior Court, a man committed suicide 
prior to releasing his sperm to his partner, but he bequeathed the sperm in his 
last will and testament, which she subsequently requested from the sperm 
bank.199 The man’s then living children opposed giving her their father’s sperm, 
arguing that doing so violated public policy because the two partners were 
unmarried and any birth would impose a step-sibling upon them.200 However, 
the California Appellate Court held that the man’s sperm was his separate, 
personal property and, as such, could be bequeathed through his estate.201 
Furthermore, artificially inseminating the decedent’s partner with the decedent’s 
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sperm is a personal decision and did not violate public policy of the state.202 
But significant resistance to surrogacy remains, especially when it involves a 
genetic surrogate. As one commentator observes, “American culture heralds a 
natural mother-child bond,” and “surrogate women are sometimes seen as 
deviant mothers, making the decision to give up a child before getting pregnant 
and violating the sacred bond between mother and child in the process.”203 
For same-sex couples the issue of surrogacy is more complicated since same-
sex marriage was not an option in all of the states until 2015.204 In addition, some 
states had policies discouraging same-sex parenthood, and there were, and are, 
continuing restraints upon enforcing surrogacy contracts that may be 
accentuated by the fact that same-sex parties are involved.205 The difficulties 
encountered by same-sex couples is illustrated in Pavan v. Smith.206 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute regarding the right 
of same-sex parents to have their names be listed on their child’s birth 
certificates.207 An Arkansas state statute provided that when a couple was 
married and the female spouse gave birth to a child via in vitro fertilization, her 
male spouse’s name was placed on the birth certificate as the other parent of the 
resulting child.208 Arkansas state officials refused to extend this right to now-
married same-sex female couples and, as a result, the Court was forced to 
intervene.209 The Court held that the statute had to be gender neutral in light of 
the Court’s ruling in Obergefell, thereby mandating that the woman’s female 
spouse have her name placed on the birth certificate as a parent of the child 
conceived through in vitro fertilization.210 
In addition to any animus concerning same-sex couples today, there still 
exists, “the attitude towards the practice of surrogacy both inside and outside the 
U.S. [that] . . . is still ambivalent at best, and many researchers and judges oppose 
freedom of contract concerning this issue.”211 Objections to surrogacy focus on 
public policy prohibiting trafficking of babies, prohibitions against taking 
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children from parents, and concerns over the capacity or voluntariness of persons 
entering into surrogacy contracts.212 One author summarized the issues with 
surrogacy as follows: 
Because surrogacy contracts deal with elementary human rights, which 
are of high personal and social importance, any rigid enforcement of 
such contracts or total withdrawal from them may cause damage that is 
detrimental to the sides. Similarly, every considered solution, such as 
monetary refund or compensation, which may be appropriate in the 
commercial context, is irrelevant in the intimate context of surrogacy 
contracts since the sole goal of the agreement is the birth of a child and 
the establishment of that child’s legal parenthood. Likewise, we should 
not forget that the subject of such agreement is a child whose interests 
and rights could be badly damaged should the parties be unable to reach 
a just compromise.213 
Nonetheless, there is the suggestion that evidence “demonstrates the recent shift 
and accelerated social and legal acceptance of the surrogacy practice.”214 If 
attitudes toward surrogacy are changing, then “the dilemma now centers on the 
question of how to execute such contracts in the best possible way in order to 
maximize their feasibility and durability at the state, federal, and international 
levels.”215 
Comments to the newly revised UPA (2017) illustrate the tentative acceptance 
of surrogacy contracts among the states, particularly genetic or traditional 
surrogacy, which involves the woman using her own gametes.216 As this Article 
will discuss, the revised UPA, while recognizing “the controversial nature of 
surrogacy itself,”217 takes note that more “states address surrogacy by statute, 
and more people are having children through surrogacy.”218 Technological 
advances during the recent decades have made surrogacy an option for persons 
and couples, which the states gradually accommodate through revised statutes. 
But the process is fraught with challenge and scrutiny.  
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B. Challenge and Scrutiny 
1. Heightened Scrutiny 
When the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution 
guaranteed same-sex couples the right to enter into marriage, the Court 
mandated that same-sex couples be treated equally with opposite-sex couples.219  
Commensurate with the Supreme Court’s decision, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted a 2017 revision of the UPA that, 
among other revisions, amended the Act’s provisions so that they “address and 
apply equally to same-sex couples.220 These changes include broadening the 
presumptions, acknowledgement, genetic testing, and assisted reproduction 
articles to make them gender neutral.”221 Prior versions of the Act distinguished 
between paternity and maternity and created different mechanisms for 
establishing each one. “Not only did this distinction erect different rules for men 
and women, but it also reinforced the notion that some inherent difference exists 
between mothers and fathers.”222 To illustrate, all states have what is referred to 
as a marital presumption, which provides that a child born to a married woman 
is presumptively the child of that woman’s husband, not that woman’s wife.223 
This was the issue illustrated in the Pavan decision.224 “The UPA addresses this 
potential constitutional infirmity by making the marital presumption expressly 
apply equally to both male and female spouses of the woman who gave birth.”225 
International surrogacy, especially in Thailand and Mexico, has become an 
option for couples and individuals seeking to become parents through 
arrangements with foreign women willing to carry a child to term.226 Currently, 
there is debate over monitoring international surrogacy, but most often the 
debate centers on the legality of the surrogacy contract and not the practice 
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itself.227 Understandably, scrutiny of foreign contracts will intensify as 
countries, such as India, ban the practice of international surrogacy, and cases 
arise of economic coercion of young women or now, because of further 
technological advances, sex-based selection of embryos. This new technology is 
called pre-implementation genetics (PGD) and involves a procedure “by which 
an embryologist removes one cell from an eight-cell embryo and tests that cell 
for the presence of genetic defects.”228 However, what are the limits on this 
technology? Gender selection and designer babies are matters of concern. 
Proposals will be put forth by academics and legislatures, but as technology 
advances, the law is slow to meet the challenges posed. The international arena 
will offer possibilities not available in the United States and this will precipitate 
added scrutiny of what develops. 
Finally, not only in reference to surrogacy, but also pertinent to other forms 
of ART, scientific advancements “could allow two women to create a child 
without any male genetic contribution, or six parents to all contribute genetically 
to the creations of a child.”229 This technological advance is at the heart of the 
mitochondrial replacement evolution and involves, in addition, the parameters 
of posthumous conception.230 Just as surrogacy challenged traditional notions of 
parenthood, the possibility of a child with more than two parents—genetically 
or behaviorally—has arrived, prompting new issues: 
Do all parents, whatever their numbers, acquire equal parental standing, 
with equal liability for child support and equal standing to seek custody 
and visitation? If they do, how should the courts apply such principles? 
Should they seek to equalize child support obligations and custody and 
visitation rights in accordance with the parents’ ability to provide for 
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the child or should they take other approaches?231 
Two commentators suggest that when a child has multiple parents, the 
“recognition [of parental rights is] to be hierarchical, rather than equal, in 
relationships.232 The hierarchical structure presumes that a child’s best interest 
lies in the stability found in a relationship with a primary parent, and that other 
parents should receive physical custodial awards only to the extent that it does 
not undermine the relationship with the primary parent.233 Increasingly, this 
debate over the rights of multiple parents will become clearer as there are more 
cases presented before courts for judicial resolution. 
2. Parameters of Scrutiny 
A perennial issue with surrogacy contracts is what is often termed as the 
unequal power of the contracting parties.234 Technology has made it possible for 
someone in the developed world to transfer a gamete to a surrogate in the 
developing world for purposes of becoming a parent as a result of that 
developing world surrogate’s gestational labors.235 The scenario is fraught with 
issues of conscionability. There are those who decide that a fair contract is 
impossible and have banned surrogacy.236 However, for others, a surrogacy 
contract “should be seen as legitimate and enforceable, but premised upon a 
regulated, narrower notion of freedom of contract in order to protect the public 
interest.”237 The manner in which this protection will be provided is “through a 
variety of doctrines, the most relevant being: trust, fairness, reasonableness, 
good faith, increased disclosure obligation, consideration of the reliance interest 
of the other party and his individual needs, and unconscionability.”238 The most 
important of these factors is unconscionability. “Using this doctrine, courts 
weigh the fairness of the bargain when the contract was signed from both 
procedural and substantive aspects.”239 
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As the law grapples with an increasing number of people utilizing surrogacy, 
plus the expansion of technological options, legislatures address the parameters 
of scrutiny.240 Some will ban genetic (traditional) surrogacy, and some will ban 
both genetic and gestational surrogacy. However, some groups such as the 
National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will posit benchmarks of what 
appear to be conscionable based on current circumstances.241 The core factors to 
determine conscionability include: (1) age of the surrogate and intended parents; 
(2) adequate medical and mental health evaluation of the surrogate and intended 
parents; (3) independent legal representation for both the surrogate and the 
intended parents; (4) grounds and a process of rescission; (5) means of 
establishing parenthood; and (6) consideration and payment of expenses.242 
There are too many variables to consider for one set of parameters. For 
example, it is important to note that the States and the UPA both impose 
additional requirements on surrogacy agreements when the surrogate uses her 
own gametes, which is referred to as a genetic or traditional surrogacy.243 To 
illustrate, the UPA allows a genetic surrogate to withdraw her consent up until 
72 hours after birth.244 Additionally, to be enforceable, “a genetic surrogacy 
agreement must be validated by the [designated court], and the proceeding to 
validate the agreement must be commenced before assisted reproduction related 
to the surrogacy agreement.”245 
In those jurisdictions permitting surrogacy, standard eligibility requirements 
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are similar to the factors used to determine the validity of a contract, including 
age of the parties, medical condition, adequate consent to the procedure, and 
legal representation appear to be the standard eligibility requirements.246 
Surrogacy agreements must also be signed and notarized prior to the medical 
procedure in connection with the contemplated surrogacy.247 In addition, at least 
one of the parties to the agreement must be a resident of the state where the 
agreement is to be enforced.248 Also, the surrogacy agreement itself must contain 
a clause in which the surrogate agrees to become pregnant by means of assisted 
reproduction and both she and her spouse, if any, renounce any claim to the child 
conceived, and that the intended parents agree to become the parents of the child 
regardless of the number of children born or the gender, mental, or physical 
condition of each child.249 At any time, the surrogate retains the right to make 
her own health and welfare decisions regarding her pregnancy, including the 
right to terminate the pregnancy itself.250 
The intended parents must disclose in the agreement how they will pay for 
the surrogacy arrangement plus the financial responsibility for the child or 
children once born.251 Disclosure requirements are quite specific, including a 
summary of health-care policy provisions, any third-party liability liens, other 
insurance available, and any disclosure that could affect coverage or liability of 
the surrogate.252 While not required, the agreement may specify for payment of 
consideration, payment of reasonable expenses, and for reimbursement of 
specific expenses if the agreement is terminated.253 Likewise, the agreement 
must disclose any information about the right of any party to the agreement to 
terminate the surrogacy agreement.254 
In addition to the requirements listed by the UPA, other commentators suggest 
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that all parties receive social and psychological support during the contractual 
period.255 Appropriate to the evolution of new technologies and the international 
character of surrogacy, “state and federal legislatures create and publish an 
accepted comprehensive form of standard surrogacy contract that includes 
mandatory stipulations in order to avoid (to the extent possible) any acute 
contractual problems that would abolish the legality and enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts.”256 Currently, the revised UPA provides the most 
comprehensive model of legislation. 
III. POSTPONED CONCEPTION 
A. Posthumous Conception 
From the start of parenthood until the present time, women were pregnant and 
the father of their child or children sometimes died prior to the birth of their 
children, who were in gestation at the time of the father’s death. Children born 
after the death of their parent, but in gestation at the death of that parent, are 
referred to as a “posthumous birth.” There are statutory provisions prescribing 
that such children are able to inherit as if they were alive at the death of the 
decedent, but many statutes require the infants to survive a certain number of 
days after birth.257 However, technological advances associated with ART have 
enhanced this paradigm. First, since it is possible that a woman may 
cryopreserve her gametes, it is now possible that a woman may predecease the 
birth or conception of her own child.258 Therefore, posthumous birth may now 
occur with women who die prior to their egg or eggs, implanted in a surrogate, 
progressing toward a live birth.259 Second, both women and men may 
cryopreserve gametes—eggs, sperm, or embryos—for conception and birth after 
their death.260 This development is described as “posthumous conception.”261 
                                                          
 255 Margalit, supra note 214, at 464. 
 256 Id. at 466. 
 257 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (1969) (an individual in gestation at a 
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The science is new, as is the discussion of any ethical implications.262 
ART makes it possible for babies to be born without sexual intercourse. 
Included within this technology is the ability to bring about conception of a 
human baby after the death of the male or female donor of the gamete.263 It is 
difficult to estimate how long the gamete may be cryopreserved prior to 
commencing its final cycle leading to birth of a child. In 2009, ABC News 
reported that a baby girl was born from a man’s frozen sperm that had been 
cryopreserved for more than 22 years.264 More attention will be paid to long term 
banking in the future, but at present, most facts involve a man or woman seeking 
to become a parent in the not-too-distant future, usually with a current partner, 
and therefore “banking” gametes for this purpose now. 
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, one of the earliest cases 
regarding posthumous conception, a man and a woman were married when the 
couple was informed that the husband had leukemia and that necessary medical 
treatments may leave him sterile.265 Thereupon the couple arranged for a 
quantity of the man’s sperm to be withdrawn and cryopreserved for future use.266 
Sadly, the man died of the disease shortly after his diagnosis, leaving behind his 
wife and his cryopreserved sperm.267 Because the wife had access to the sperm, 
she underwent artificial insemination using his sperm and subsequently gave 
birth to twin girls in 1995.268 Three months later, the mother of the twins applied 
for surviving child benefits on behalf of the twin girls from the Social Security 
Administration.269 These benefits are allowed for the minor children of a 
decedent parent qualified to take under the Social Security Act and permit the 
children to receive monetary awards each month until turning majority.270 
The mother’s application on behalf of the twins was denied by the Social 
Security administrator because the federal benefits are contingent upon whether 
the twins qualify as the husband’s children.271 To be his children they must be 
                                                          
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
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 262 See, e.g., Katarina Lee, Ethical Considerations of Ovarian and Testicular Tissue 
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 263 Banks, supra note 265, at 272-73. 
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entitled to inherit from his intestate estate under the laws of the husband’s 
state.272 Thus, are children conceived after the death of a parent to be considered 
as the decedent’s children? 
Massachusetts, like most states at the time, never considered posthumous 
conception.273 The state statute on intestacy was drafted and enacted long before 
such technology became available. However, as the Massachusetts court pointed 
out in its opinion, “Neither the statute’s ‘posthumous children’ provision . . . nor 
any other provision of our intestacy law limits the class of posthumous children 
to those in utero at the time of the decedent’s death.”274 Specifically, the 
“Massachusetts intestacy statute thus does not contain an express, affirmative 
requirement that posthumous children must “be in existence” as of the date of 
the decedent’s death.”275 Based in part on the state’s statutory failure to require 
that the baby be born or in utero in order to inherit from a decedent, the state’s 
highest court ruled that the twins were eligible to inherit, thus making them 
eligible to receive minor children survivorship Social Security benefits.276 
While the silence of the state’s statute was a significant factor in the court’s 
decision, the court stressed the importance of the best interest of children,277 the 
technological advances made in the area of assisted reproductive technology,278 
and the state’s concerns over the timely distribution of a decedent’s estate.279 As 
do many of the state and federal courts, the Massachusetts court called upon the 
legislature to address the advances in reproductive technology that generated the 
issue involved.280 
The Massachusetts court then ruled, based on common law principles and 
existing state statutes: 
[We] conclude that limited circumstances may exist, consistent with the 
mandates of our Legislature, in which posthumously conceived children 
may enjoy the inheritance rights of “issue” under our intestacy law. These 
limited circumstances exist where, as a threshold matter, the surviving 
parent or the child’s other legal representative demonstrates a genetic 
relationship between the child and the decedent. The survivor or 
representative must then establish both that the decedent affirmatively 
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting 
child. Even where such circumstances exist, time limitations may preclude 
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commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of a posthumously 
conceived child. In any action brought to establish such inheritance rights, 
notice must be given to all interested parties.281 
This Massachusetts decision was the first of many involving guardians applying 
for Social Security survivorship benefits on behalf of children conceived 
posthumously. The response of other state courts, based solely on more 
restrictive state inheritance statutes, was to deny the benefits because the 
children could not inherit from the decedent’s estate under intestate 
succession.282 In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States entered the fray 
and confirmed that the wording of the Social Security Act was operative and that 
a posthumously conceived child is eligible for Social Security survivorship 
benefits, but only if that child would be an intestate heir of the predeceasing 
parent.283 Gradually, uniform commissions and state legislatures are enacting 
legislation to accommodate posthumous conception.284 
B. Statutory Framework 
Today, more than a quarter of the states have enacted legislation specifically 
governing posthumous conception, but there has yet to be an approved model 
act.285 Indeed, even though legislation has acknowledged the technological 
advances occurring through assisted reproduction, the parameters of the statutes 
vary. The revised UPA (2017) provides that an individual who, (1) consents in 
a record to assisted reproduction, (2) dies prior to transfer of gametes or 
embryos, that individual is a parent of the resulting child only if, (3) the record 
states that the individual consented to parenthood through posthumous 
conception or there is clear and convincing evidence providing the individual’s 
intent.286 In addition, (4) the embryo must be in utero not later than 36 months 
after the decedent’s death or the child is born not later than 45 months after the 
decedent’s death.287 
The approach of the UPA is meant to be consistent with the Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC). The UPC provides that an individual is a parent of a child of 
assisted reproduction even though the child is conceived after the individual’s 
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death as long as the child is either in utero no later than 36 months after the 
individual’s death or born not later than 45 months after the individual’s 
death.288 The child is treated as in gestation at the time of the individual’s death 
and must still survive for five days after birth.289 To qualify as a parent through 
posthumous conception, there must be a record establishing the decedent’s 
consent or, in the absence of this, clear and convincing evidence of the same.290 
State statutes may vary slightly from the uniform acts cited.291 For example, 
California provides for posthumous conception by requiring that such a child be 
treated as if born during the lifetime of the decedent if there is clear and 
convincing evidence of the following: (1) in writing, signed and dated, the 
decedent specifies that his or her genetic materials was to be used for 
posthumous conception, (2) the writing may be revoked or amended if signed 
and dated, (3) the decedent designates a person to control the use of the genetic 
materials, (4) notice is given to this person within four months of the decedent’s 
death, and (5) the intended child was in utero within two years of death.292 
Current legislation seeks to balance the right of a person to procreate,293 even 
posthumously, with the need for the state to accommodate speedy administration 
of estates and distribution of any concomitant benefits. Future technological 
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developments may outpace the current statutes, as the pace of legislative 
enactments is slow to accommodate evolving technologies. Hence, statutes that 
limit birth of a child to two or three years may seriously jeopardize the 
decedent’s fundamental right to procreate should science be able to “bank” his 
or her gametes for longer and longer periods of time.294 Because these statutes 
are meant to establish foreseeable entitlement to benefits, such as inheritance 
claims, dynastic legacies, and federal benefits such as those illustrated in the 
Woodward decision, ambivalence in statutory language will inhibit the orderly 
administration of estates.295 Inheritance is not only about a time frame for 
inheritance, it is about who may inherit within that time frame too. 
Technology will continue to challenge even recently modified parameters of 
parenthood. Many of these challenges may involve postponed conception too. 
As one commentator illustrates, and as this Article will address in the next 
section, the “ability to create a child from two women, two men, or multiple 
parents emerges from two developing technologies, somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT) and stem cell technology.”296 The commentator describes the process 
as follows: “SCNT entails removing the original nucleus from an egg (which is 
then knows as an ‘enucleated egg’) and replacing the nucleus with nuclear 
material from one or more individuals and sources. After being induced to divide 
in a laboratory, the embryo, also knows as a blastocyst, is then implanted into a 
uterus and allowed to gestate to form a complete organism.”297 Similarly, 
advances “in reproductive medicine, such as uterine transplantation, animal-
human chimeric technology, and artificial wombs, may obviate the need for a 
female gestational mother in the future.”298 Indeed, the “success of uterine 
transplantation in sheep, dogs, and mice, the initiation of human uterine 
transplantation scheduled in the United Kingdom and Sweden, and the various 
other planned attempts to pursue human uterine transplantation raise the 
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possibility that one day a uterus could be transplanted into a man.”299 It remains 
to be seen, but, as was true with surrogacy, the acceptance of uterine 
transplantation may well occur because of its utilization by the LGBTQ 
community.300 
Currently the debate occurring among commentators is over parental rights 
and responsibilities toward the child, duties of support, and associated claims of 
parentage.301 Which persons may become parents? But there is another side to 
the equation: from whom may a child take when a decedent dies survived by 
that child? Inheritance occurs because of defined–often traditionally defined—
rules based on blood or adoption.302 There are few exceptions, one being when 
a child is born via in vitro fertilization,303 and the other is when a child is born 
to a gestational carrier, such as a surrogate.304 These exceptions, both permitting 
inheritance by someone not related through blood or adoption, are premised 
upon defined circumstances precipitating inheritance.305 Other than when a 
decedent has been prescient enough to execute a valid last will and testament, 
inheritance is premised upon state intestate statutes and these are, as the cases 
readily illustrate, slow to incorporate the technological advances made by 
assisted reproductive technology. 
IV. MULTIPLE GENETIC PARENTS 
A. Functional Parenthood 
The concept of family, parent, and even marriage continues to evolve. Today, 
this evolution embraces the concept of multiple parents for the same child or 
children.306 Traditionally, when a child is adopted by a non-genetic person, or 
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persons, the adoption severs the relationship between the child and that child’s 
genetic parents.307 However, gradually parents of children wanted their current 
spouses to share a committed family relationship with children from other 
partners or spouses. The law accommodated this by permitting a stepparent to 
adopt a stepchild but retain a modicum of rights in the non-custodial parent.308 
The effect of this is to retain the rights of both genetic parents and to include the 
rights of a third parent, the former stepparent.309 There are three restrictions to 
effectuate the granting of such rights. First, there must be a valid marriage 
between the genetic parent and his or her spouse to initiate stepparent 
adoption.310 Second, the other genetic parent (the one not married to the 
stepparent) must agree to the stepparent’s adoption of his or her genetic child.311 
Unless the other genetic parent agrees, there can be no stepparent adoption.312 
Third, statutes limit the right of the other genetic parent, the non-spouse, to 
inherit from or through the child in the event that the child should die intestate.313 
However, the child may still inherit from or through that genetic parent.314 
The UPC creates another parental status, a person who has “functioned as a 
parent of the child.”315 However, this status refers to a doctrine known as 
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equitable adoption. “Equitable adoption is not adoption. Rather, it is an equity 
device, sometimes called ‘virtual adoption’ or ‘adoption by estoppel,’ by which 
the courts permit an intended heir to share in the intestate estate of a 
decedent.”316 The majority of states permit a person to inherit intestate – there is 
an absence of a valid last will and testament—from an individual when certain 
conditions are met, such as the decedent “functioned as a parent of the child.”317 
Hence, functioning as a parent is more of an inheritance device for persons with 
no genetic or adoptive connection but who have been treated as a child by the 
decedent for a sufficient period of time.318 
There are other models granting parental status. For example, the “American 
Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and an increasing 
number of states provide recognition to adults who have assumed parental roles 
without a biological tie to the child, in some cases on the basis of function alone 
and in other cases on the basis of a combination of intent, assumption of a 
parental role, and/or the consent of the initial legal parent.”319 Function serves 
to establish parenthood whenever adults who, though not otherwise legal 
parents, have assumed a parental role “as part of a prior co-parenting agreement 
with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents).”320 
The second category is de facto parent, defined as someone who: 
(1) Lived with the child for a significant period of time not less than two 
years; (2) with the agreement of the legal parent; (3) primarily to form a 
parent-child relationship and not primarily for financial compensation, or 
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as a result of a legal parent’s complete failure to perform caretaking 
functions; and (4) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking 
functions for the child or regularly performed a share of caretaking 
functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child 
primarily lived.321 
Professors of law, Carbone and Cahn, argue that the LGBTQ community 
began to use the concept of intent to establish parenthood, sometimes augmented 
with function.322 As with the gradual acceptance of surrogacy in the overall 
population, “[LGBTQ] advocates have been in the forefront of efforts to gain 
recognition of more than two parents in part because they have consciously 
fought to create alternate models that better fit their circumstances.”323 
Nonetheless, not all of categories of what has come to be called parents share 
equal parenting rights. “While a parent by estoppel occupies a status comparable 
to that of a legal parent, de facto parents do not. A de facto parent, for example, 
cannot receive primary physical custodial responsibility if a fit legal parent is 
able and willing to take such responsibility.”324 
Finally, in its 2017 revision to the UPA, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included a provision for the 
establishment of a “de facto parent” as a legal parent of a child.325 The 
Commissioners included this provision because of similar enactments, judicially 
and legislatively, among some of the states, “ranging from Massachusetts, to 
West Virginia, to North and South Carolina, to Texas.”326 Some states use 
different terms rather than de facto parent, such as “in loco parentis,” or 
“psychological parents.”327 If a petitioner has formed a bonded and dependent 
parent-child relationship with a child, then this individual may be recognized as 
a legal parent.328 
For de facto parentage to be established under the UPA, the petition must be 
filed during the lifetime of the petitioner and the child, and before the child turns 
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the psychological parent to whom the child turns for love, guidance, and security”). 
 328 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. 
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18 years of age.329 There is a two-stage process to establish de facto parenthood. 
Assuming that the petitioner can establish a preponderance of the evidence330 
and that he or she or they qualify as de facto parents, there can be an adjudication 
as to whether the petitioner can establish the following facts: 
(1) the individual resided with the child as a regular member of the 
child’s household for a significant period; 
(2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking for the child; 
(3) the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a 
parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; 
(4) the individual held out the child as the individual’s child; 
(5) the individual established a bonded and dependent relationship with 
the child which is parental in nature; 
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and 
dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and 
(7) continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is 
in the best interest of the child.331 
There are similarities between the UPA and the de facto provision offered by 
the American Law Institute (ALI). However, note there are differences too. First, 
note the absence of a time duration in the UPA, as there is in the ALI.332 Second, 
the UPA requires that the petitioner resided with the child as a regular member 
of the child’s household for a significant period of time.333 Third, the UPA 
mandates that any claimant must, as an initial matter, provide at least a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she or they can meet the seven elements 
required by the statute.334 “This requirement is included to ensure that permitting 
proceedings by de facto parents does not subject parents to unwarranted and 
unjustified litigation.”335 Fourth, the petitioner, with the encouragement of the 
parent, formed a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is 
parental in nature.336 Fifth, only the petitioner may petition to become a de facto 
parent, thereby denying the right to any third party, such as the state, which may 
be seeking to obtain child support from a stepparent.337 
All of the efforts to establish parental status outside of adoption or a genetic 
                                                          
 329 Id. § 6-609(a)(1), (b). 
 330 Id. § 609(c)(3). 
 331 Id. § 609(d)(1)-(7). 
 332 Id. § 609(d)(1) (requiring only a “significant period” of time); PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY 
LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (Am. L. Inst.  2002) 
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 333 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(1). 
 334 Id. § 609(c)(3). 
 335 Id. § 609 cmt. 
 336 Id. § 609(d)(5)-(6). 
 337 Id. § 609 cmt. (“[t]his section permits only the individual alleging himself or herself 
to be a de facto parent to initiate a proceeding under this section.”). 
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connection rest upon the premise that, “actual parent-child bonds are important 
to children and that these relationships are worthy of protection.”338 The fact that 
the de facto parent relationship may come into existence after the birth of the 
child and is applied in gender-neutral terms is innovative.339 Addressing parental 
rights and responsibilities inherent in this status, at least one commentator 
suggests that de facto parents “stand in parity with any other legal parents, 
including genetic parents, for all purposes.”340 The full parameters of these 
relationships remain to be determined. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the arguments concerning the 
rights of genetic and functional parents, but this debate will continue as more 
claims occur based on non-genetic parental grounds.341  Furthermore, because 
of technological advances, future debate must involve the possibility that a child 
now may have more than two genetic parents.342 Previous discussion of 
stepparent adoption, equitable adoption, and the permeations of de facto 
parenthood offer context to what has already a reality, in vitro fertilization and 
a mitochondrial/nuclear transfer path to multiple genetic parenthood. 
B. Mitochondrial Transfer 
On April 6, 2016, a baby boy was born in Mexico City as a result of a 
procedure known as MRT,343 the birth involving genetic material from not two, 
but three different people.344 This procedure, MRT, and the resulting birth of a 
healthy baby mark a technological development of significant proportions as 
until then, “every child begins with two (and only two) suppliers of genetic 
material and one (and only one) gestational carrier.”345 While the purpose of 
MRT is to avoid the transmission of mitochondrial disease, a serious illness, the 
technology used involves the paradigm of human parentage, human genetics, 
and thus social consequences. The consequences occur because MRT donations 
challenge “prevailing cultural assumptions about the symbolic and biological 
                                                          
 338 Joslin, supra note 225, at 600. 
 339 Id. at 601. 
 340 Id. at 602. 
 341 See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 15, at 94-97; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: 
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significance of genetic material.”346 
A woman who carries mitochondrial disease risks a difficult pregnancy and 
the birth of a child with the serious effects of that disease.347 While it is possible 
for a woman to become a parent in other ways than using her own gametes and 
carrying the child to term, such as adoption or the use of donor eggs, the use of 
MRT permits a woman to have a genetic connection with her child. There are 
those who argue that genetic affinity is of sufficient importance and that it 
justifies expending private and public funds to make the procedure accessible to 
persons seeking to utilize its benefits.348 Others argue that since “human oocytes 
are essential to promising stem-cell technologies that would treat serious 
conditions—including Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s, and indeed 
mitochondrial disease itself—allocation of this scarce resource to three-parent 
IVF is unjustified.”349 Indeed, this commentator argues that the technology does 
not meet a plausible social-value standard to render public research investment 
into its development. She reports that mitochondrial diseases are too rare to 
justify the expenditure. “If the incidence is one in 4,000 cases per birth, then 
roughly 80,000 Americans are affected. This is far below the threshold 
commonly used in the United States to define a disease as rare; by that standard, 
fewer than 200,000 people are affected.”350   
Implicit in the debate over funding of MRT, is the fact that the procedure and 
resulting live birth of a healthy baby illustrates that it is possible to add the 
genetic material of a third party—in addition to the gestational mother and the 
father—to create a child with three genetic parents.351 This is the technological 
innovation that will generate controversy, this and the question of what comes 
next. 
1. Procedure 
The procedure involving genetic material from three persons to create a child 
was developed to permit “a woman with a mitochondrial disorder to give birth 
to healthy children by pairing her nuclear DNA with the healthy mitochondria 
                                                          
 346 Rebecca Dimond and Neil Stephens, Three Persons, Three Genetic Contributors, 
Three Parents: Mitochondrial Donation, Genetic Parenting and the Immutable Grammar of 
the ‘Three x x’, HEALTH 5 (2017). 
 347 AMEL KARAA ET AL., EFFECTS OF MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE/DYSFUNCTION ON 
PREGNANCY: A RETROSPECTIVE STUDY 3-4 (2018). 
 348 See, e.g., Schaefer & Labude, supra note 31, at 1579. 
 349 See Tina Rulli, What is the Value of Three-Parent IVF?, 46 HASTING CTR. REP. 38, 44 
(2016). 
 350 Id. at 43. 
 351 Id. at 38. 
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from a donor’s egg.”352 Medical findings suggest that 
mtDNA is passed on from the egg, all children from affected women 
inherit these mitochondrial mutations . . . by removing the nuclear DNA 
from the target egg’s defective mtDNA and placing it within a donated 
egg with healthy mtDNA . . . so that the healthy mtDNA is the only 
contribution by the donor. For families carrying mtDNA, MRT is a 
source of hope for a future with genetically related children.353  
This is a breakthrough. 
In February 2015, the United Kingdom gave its approval to the procedure, 
ending a three and one-half year study of “the safety and ethics of creating 
humans with DNA from three different people.”354 The process is described as 
the following: 
MRT is an in vitro fertilization (IVF) technique that involves removing 
an intended mother’s nDNA [(nuclear DNA)] from her oocyte or 
zygote, which contains mutated mtDNA[ (mitochondrial DNA)], and 
transferring it into a female provider’s oocyte or zygote, which contains 
nonpathogenic mtDNA and from which the nDNA has been removed. 
The woman providing oocytes would have no personal or family history 
or genetic evidence of having mutated, pathogenic mtDNA . . . [The] 
term “MRT” encompasses both the transfer of the nuclear genetic 
material and the accompanying fertilization procedure that is necessary 
to produce a human embryo. These techniques could allow intended 
mothers to produce a child that would share their nDNA without passing 
on their pathogenic mtDNA. Three techniques are most advanced in 
development: maternal spindle transfer (MST); pronuclear transfer 
(PNT); and, most recent, polar body transfer (PBT).355 
Another author describes the procedure as the following: 
[MRT] divides the label of the genetic parent even further than the 
traditional forms of ART in that a single child conceived by MRT may 
have two legitimate ‘genetic mothers.’ This situation results because 
MRT works by manipulating egg cells prior to fertilization. Egg cells 
consist of nuclei with nuclear DNA—the “instruction manual” for the 
cell—and many intracellular organelles that carry on the functions of 
our cells—the “machinery” of the cell.’ . . . MRT, then, is a process 
which removes the nucleus from one egg and transfers the nucleus into 
the remnants of different donated egg (which previously had its nucleus 
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removed and discarded). The resultant egg has a nucleus from one 
individual (the “nuclear mother”) and mitochondrial DNA from a donor 
(the “mitochondrial mother”). The father’s sperm then fertilizes the 
newly assembled egg, and it is implanted in the nuclear mother in order 
to begin the pregnancy.356 
With regards to solely its treatment for mitochondrial disease, successful 
MRT can make it easier for a woman to conceive, to carry the child to term, and 
then to permit the resulting child to live a healthier life.357 Without the procedure, 
mitochondrial “DNA mutations can cause diseases and defects in many vital 
organs including the brain, liver, heart, and kidneys, they can affect muscles and 
the central nervous system, and they ‘may contribute to the development of 
common multifactorial disorders such as diabetes mellitus and 
neurodegenerative disease.’”358 
2. Prospective Regulation 
Currently, MRT is legal only in the United Kingdom.359 “In the United States, 
in February 2016, a specially constituted committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEN) sanctioned a slightly narrower 
use of MRT than that regulated in the United Kingdom.”360 Concerning 
prospective regulation, the statement released by the Committee is cautious: 
“The committee concludes that the most germane ethical, social, and policy 
considerations associated with MRT could be avoided through limitations on the 
use of MRT or are blunted by meaningful differences between the heritable 
genetic modification of nDNA and that introduced by MRT. Therefore, the 
committee concludes that it is ethically permissible to conduct clinical 
investigations of MRT, subject to certain conditions and principles laid out in 
this report.”361 
Overall, the National Academy of Sciences Committee recommends clinical 
studies that will minimize “a future child’s exposure to risk, while ascertaining 
the safety and efficacy of the techniques.”362 Specifically, the Committee 
recommends:  
                                                          
 356 Green, supra note 27, at 255. 
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(1) limiting clinical investigations to women who are otherwise at risk 
of transmitting mtDNA disease, where the mutation’s pathogenicity is 
undisputed, and the clinical presentation of the disease is predicted to 
be severe, as characterized by early mortality or substantial impairment 
of basic functions; and (2) transferring only male embryos for gestation 
to avoid introducing heritable genetic modification during initial 
clinical investigations.363 
It has been suggested that the United States, overall, takes a more laissez-faire 
approach to regulation of assisted reproduction, perhaps due to concerns over 
privacy rights implicit in the Constitution.364 However, as the Committee 
appointed by the National Academy of Sciences points out, in the United States, 
“MRT would be subject to a complex landscape of state and federal laws and 
regulations. The legality of the research on MRT—and perhaps even the clinical 
application—would vary from state to state as a result of differing laws on fetal 
and embryo research, including cloning.”365 Any evaluation of the applicable 
regulatory mechanism governing the regulation of MRT is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it illustrates the complexity of the technology—and the debate 
it precipitates—when the Committee admits that potential “oversight of both the 
research on and clinical use of MRT would me complex, with uncertainty over 
the precise interpretation of how laws and regulations would apply.”366 
After the MRT baby was successfully born in Mexico in 2016, “it is likely 
that other countries will advance consideration of the appropriateness of 
mitochondrial treatments being allowed to proceed to implementation and term 
birth.”367 Currently, MRT “remains effectively banned or heavily restricted in 
many parts of the world, including most of Europe, the USA, Australia, New 
Zealand and Singapore, among many others.”368 
Many competing claims will be raised in any future discussion of prospective 
regulation of MRT.369 In addition to the ones mentioned infra, including utility 
of resources, multiple parenthood, and the procreative rights of citizens, there 
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are the issues of future cloning of humans,370 possible health effects arising from 
mitochondrial replacement therapy,371 and the possibility and consequence of 
designer babies.372 Opponents of MRT raise ethical and conceptual concerns 
over whether “it is a form of germline gene therapy, and whether children born 
following [MRT] are genetically modified.”373 Religious and ethical groups will 
demand input, all parties producing a composition of the ethical, legal and social 
issues involved in this new technology.374 While this discussion continues, 
technology will continue to advance calling into question further issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Technological innovation is relentless and ignoring its innovations is perilous. 
Change always invites controversy, and this is especially true when change 
involves human reproduction. For now, we can make the following assessment 
of assisted reproductive technology. First, statistically, an increasing number of 
persons and couples are utilizing the various forms of assisted reproduction to 
become parents now or in the future. As insurance becomes available to 
subsidize the assistance, more persons and couples will take advantage of this 
technology and the technology yet to be available. Likewise, surrogacy is more 
accepted by the public and by states, especially gestational surrogacy. It is 
arguable that the increasing use of assisted reproduction, especially surrogacy, 
is influenced by the utilization and acceptance of the LGBTQ community. The 
rise of a more functional, rather than form families supports the acceptance of 
ART. This is illustrated in the rise of nonmarital cohabitation and statutory 
recognition of status arrangements such as de facto parenthood. 
Second, states accommodate ART in the postponing of conception until after 
the death of the gamete provider. Uniform legislation and an increasing number 
of states have enacted posthumous conception statutes, thereby acknowledging 
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that a decedent donor could become a parent long after his or her death. 
Undoubtedly, this technology will strain state efforts to accommodate testate, 
intestate, and non-probate wealth after the decedent’s death. However, as with 
other advances, an accommodation will be found. The fact that courts and states 
are grappling with issues presented signals an ascending acceptance of the fact 
of ART technology. 
Third, ART’s technological advances will test the limits of the Constitution: 
privacy, the right to liberty, equal protection, due process, and freedom of 
religion will all be inculcated into an ongoing debate of what is right, wrong, or 
simply a slippery slope. 
Fourth, for the first time in history, it is now possible for a baby to have more 
than two genetic parents. Conceptually, it is possible that a child could have 
more than two parents through stepparent adoption, surrogacy, or intentionality 
and functionality. However, until recently, the fact was that a baby only had two 
genetic parents. Today, technology makes it possible—and the birth of a baby 
in 2016—illustrates this, for a child to have more than two genetic parents 
through mitochondrial transfer (MRT). While the transfer will allow for a 
woman to have a genetic connection to her baby, it also prevents the debilitating 
effects of mitochondrial disease. The technological parameters of this innovation 
are nascent, and the procedure and prospective regulations are undetermined. 
This Article makes no assessment of the ethical, legal or sociological 
assessments of the evolution of assisted reproductive technology. Instead, the 
goal of this Article is to provide an assessment of where the technology is at this 
point in history. Providing an assessment will make it easier to formulate an 
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